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II. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the Ada County district court acting in its appellate capacity. 
The trial court granted Mr. Neal's motion to suppress evidence resulting from a traffic 
stop, and the district court reversed. Mr. Neal timely appealed to this Court pursuant to 
I.AR. 11(c)(10). See also, State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1008-09 (Ct. App. 1989). 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
On the evening of November 14, 2012, Mr. Neal was traveling in his white 
Chevrolet truck down State Street. R. 101. Officer Thueson followed Mr. Neal's vehicle for 
approximately a mile. Tr. p. 31, 11. 17-25, p. 32, IL 1-10. Officer Thueson initially stated that 
he twice observed Mr. Neal's vehicle touch a fog line, but ultimately it was revealed that 
only one of the lines was a fog line. Tr. p. 33, 11. 2-23. The other line constituted one of 
two markings, between which was a lane apparently intended for bicycles. R. 101. Officer 
Thueson never witnessed Mr. Neal speed, fail to signal, or commit any traffic infraction 
other than the purported infraction at issue in this case. Tr. p. 35, 11. 2-9. Instead, "the 
only things [he] observed [were] two tires on top -- not crossing over, but on top of the 
fog line; and then, later on ... the bicycle markings." Tr. p. 35, 11-10-16. Officer Thueson 
then "initiated [his] traffic stop" when he "hit [his] lights." Tr. p. 38, 11. 7-9. After Mr. Neal 
was seized, he was accused of violating I.C. §§ 18-8004(1)(a), 18-8005(4). R. 5, 29. 
Mr. Neal moved to suppress the evidence resulting from the seizure, R. 11, and 
provided a memorandum and affidavit in support. R. 32-43. After receiving testimony 
and evidence, Magistrate Swain afforded both sides the opportunity to supply written 
1 
closing arguments, tr. p. 40, II. 1-20, which both sides did. R. 78-100. The state proffered 
three rationales for its position that Mr. Neal's driving gave rise to legal cause to seize his 
vehicle: that he violated LC.§ 49-637 and Boise City Code§ 10-10-17, and that his driving 
was so abnormal that it provided reason to believe he was intoxicated. 
Magistrate Swain granted Mr. Neal's motion to suppress, reasoning that "there was 
no evidence this occurred in Boise," which eliminated the possibility that the Boise City 
Code could apply. R. 102. Magistrate Swain also described Mr. Neal's driving as a "rather 
innocuous driving pattern," after holding that he was "not persuaded that driving on, but 
not across, a dividing line is a violation of Idaho Code sec. 49-637." R. 103. The state 
timely appealed, R. 149, and the district court reversed. R. 228. However, the district 
court did "agree[] with [Magistrate] Swain ... that Mr. Neal's driving behavior was not 
sufficiently outside the normal range of driving behavior to constitute reasonable 
suspicion that he was driving under the influence." R. 226 n. 9. Mr. Neal timely appealed 
to this Court. R. 232, 236. 
III. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the district court erred by holding that the fog line is not part of the lane. 
B. Whether the district court erred when, among other things, it interpreted Idaho Code § 
49-637 to require near-perfect driving by motorists, despite the statute's limiting language 
that driving need only be within a lane "as nearly as practicable." 
C. Whether the district court erred when it found, contrary to the magistrate's factual 
finding, that there existed sufficient evidence to prove that the relevant events occurred 
within Boise City limits. 
D. Whether, if the Boise City Code could apply, the district court erred by concluding that 
a violation of the code occurred. 
E. Whether the district court erred by holding that a law enforcement officer's mistake of 
2 
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law is sufficient to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation 
occurred, when the state never argued that the district court should so hold. 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Standard of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. This Court accepts 
the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts found." State v. Watts, 142 
Idaho 230, 232 (2005). Questions of statutory interpretation are "question[s] of law over 
which we exercise free review." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680,689 (2004). 
When reviewing an appeal from the district court acting in its appellate capacity, 
this Court directly reviews the district court. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670 (2008). 
Statutory and Ordinance Interpretation 
"Rules for construction of an ordinance are the same as for construction of a 
statute." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646,649 (Ct. App. 2006). "Where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 (Ct. App. 
2001). "This Court may not ignore or amend unambiguous statutes; rather, policy 
arguments for altering unambiguous statutes must be advanced before the legislature." 
Rogers v. Household Life Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 735, 739 (2011). 
The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
3 
not be violated[.]" The Fourth Amendment's protections were incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment by Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (not incorporating the 
exclusionary rule). Wolf was eventually overruled as to its failure to incorporate the 
remedy of exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
A seizure without a warrant is unreasonable per se, "subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347,357 (1967). In some circumstances, traffic stops may constitute one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346 (Ct. App. 2008) 
("officers may conduct investigative detentions, including traffic stops, based upon 
reasonable suspicion that ... a vehicle is being operated contrary to traffic laws."). 
Seizures 
"The seizure of an individual requires, at a minimum, reasonable and articulable 
suspicion." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,490 (2009). "A seizure occurs - and the 
fourth amendment is implicated - when an officer, by means of physical force or show of 
authority, has in some way restrained a citizen's liberty." State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102 
(Ct. App. 1992). "The critical inquiry is whether, taking into account all of the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated 
to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go 
about his business." Id. (quotations omitted). Thus, the test is an objective test requiring 
an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486. When a 
driver observes a police vehicle's activated lights, and submits to the show of authority, he 
4 
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has been seized. Id. at 488. 
Burdens 
"It is the State's burden to establish that the seizure was based on reasonable 
suspicion and sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an 
investigative seizure." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). It is the 
defendant's "burden [to] prov[e] that a seizure occurred." Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486. 
It has never been disputed that a seizure occurred in this case. 
Remedy for Illegal Seizures 
"[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, 
by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. "Any 
evidence seized pursuant to an unlawful stop or an unreasonable detention is 'fruit of the 
poisonous tree' and is, therefore, inadmissible." Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 6. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The district court Erred by Holding that a Vehicle Exits its Lane by Touching a 
Fog Line 
Idaho Code§ 49-637 provides in relevant part: 
Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly 
marked lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all else, shall apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely 
within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the 
driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with 
safety .... 
Applying this statute, Magistrate Swain held that "[t]he court is not persuaded that 
driving on, but not across, a [fog] line is a violation[.] Merely touching the [fog] line with 
5 
one's tires does not violate the statute." R. 102. According to Magistrate Swain, a vehicle 
does not leave its lane by touching a lane's line. R. 102. The district court reversed 
Magistrate Swain's holding because 
To allow the lane marker to be part of the "lane" is not consistent with the 
language of the statute. Otherwise, in situations where there were vehicles 
in adjacent lanes, both vehicles could straddle the lane marker, at the same 
time, without violating the law. This would obviously not be a safe situation 
and cannot be whatthe legislature ( or city council) intended when they 
enacted these provisions which require vehicles to stay in their lanes. 
R. 223-24. 
The district court erred. Its primary concern appeared to be that, under Magistrate 
Swain's reasoning, two vehicles could straddle a line while maintaining their lanes. 
However, the district court's attempted reductio ad absurdum fails, because the relevant 
line was a fog line. Obviously, only one lane contains vehicles traveling on or by a fog line; 
therefore, there is simply no vehicular competition for the real estate constituting the fog 
line. This conclusion is apparent from the requirement that there first be "two (2) or 
more clearly marked lanes for traffic[.]" I.C. § 49-637. The concern of I.C. § 49-637 is 
clearly protecting against the dangers of a vehicle vis-a-vis another vehicle. That is why 
the statute only applies when at least two lanes exist. The statute is unconcerned with a 
vehicle's interaction with space where no other vehicle exists, such as the space adjacent 
to a fog line. 
The Montana Supreme Court recognized this distinction between movement on fog 
lines and movement from one marked traffic lane to another. In State v. Lafferty, the court 
6 
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interpreted an essentially identical statute 1 and held the statute regulated only movement 
between marked lanes. 967 P.2d 363, 366 (1998) ("According to the State and the District 
Court, Lafferty violated this statute by crossing the fog line without ascertaining that she 
could do so safely. In our view, however, the statute relates to moving from a marked 
traffic lane to another marked traffic lane.") Thus, movement over the fog line on the far 
right side of the traffic lane did not violate the statute. 
Mr. Neal also submits that the district court's reasoning placed undue focus on 
theory and inadequate focus on common sense. As Justice W. Jones has reasoned, "this 
case is nothing more than a matter of common sense and basic legal reasoning. I am a 
strong believer that sometimes the law gets lost in theories, over-analysis, and hyperbole 
and never sees the forest through the trees." Nield v. Pocatello Health Services, Inc.,_ 
Idaho_ (2014) ( concurring). It is simply unreasonable to conclude that, if two lanes 
share a line, vehicles will begin colliding into one another due to confusion over whose 
line is whose. Common sense tells us that that would never happen. 
Moreover, the district court was mistaken to assert that two vehicles could 
simultaneously touch a line "without violating the law." In such a circumstance, the 
drivers would each be guilty of inattentive driving for driving in an "inattentive, careless 
or imprudent" manner, just as they would if they collided where no lines existed. I.C. § 
49-1401(3). It is likely that every judge on this Court manages to safely navigate to work 
on certain streets that contain no lane markings whatsoever. Those streets would not 
suddenly become less safe if lines were painted down the middle. But according to the 
1 Stating that when a "roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic [a] vehicle shall 
be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the 
driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." 
7 
district court, drivers would become confused by the line, and vehicles would begin 
colliding into each other. This reasoning, which overemphasized theory and ignored 
common sense, is the type lamented by Justice W. Jones. The law would be violated in the 
case of simultaneous line driving. LC.§ 49-1401(3). However, Idaho Code§ 49-637 
would not. 
Regardless, in Idaho, the applicable statutes and case law are clear that a lane line 
is a part of the driver's lane of travel. For example, in State v. Atkinson, the Court of 
Appeals recognized that a "vehicle never entirely left its lane of travel" when it touched a 
center line and a fog line. 128 Idaho 552, 562 (1998). Instead, police possessed 
reasonable suspicion because of the weaving pattern involved in that case. Id. There was 
no evidence of weaving or erratic driving in this case, as even the district court 
acknowledged. Thus, Idaho case law is clear that merely touching a line does not 
constitute exiting one's lane. 
Idaho's statutes are likewise clear in this regard. Idaho Code § 49-119(19), 
defining "roadways," explains generally when a portion of a highway is designed for 
vehicular travel. "Roadways" are the portion of a highway "ordinarily used for vehicular 
travel, exclusive of sidewalks, shoulders, berms and rights-of-way." LC. § 49-119 (19). In 
general, then, a portion of a highway is designed for vehicular travel when it does not 
constitute a "sidewalk, shoulder, berm, or right-of-way." A "highway" is essentially defined 
as all roadways, plus all of the exclusions from roadways, to wit, sidewalks, shoulders, 
berms and rights-of-way not intended for motorized traffic. LC.§ 49-109(5). 
Thus, if the relevant vehicle is traveling on a highway, it is also traveling on a 
8 
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roadway to the extent the relevant section of highway is not a shoulder, sidewalk, etc. If it 
is traveling on a roadway, then it is by definition traveling on a portion of highway 
"ordinarily used for vehicular travel." If it is used for vehicular travel, it contains a lane, 
because vehicles may only travel in a lane. LC.§ 49-637. Put another way: because 
vehicles may only travel in a lane, and because roadways are designed only for vehicular 
travel, a lane line must be part of a roadway and therefore must be used for vehicular 
travel. 
The next question, then, is whether the fog line is itself a sidewalk, shoulder, berm 
or right of way not intended for motorized traffic. If it is not one of those things, then it is 
a roadway, and if it is a roadway, then it is used for vehicular travel and therefore is a part 
of the lane. Of course, a sidewalk does not include the line, and its definition is extremely 
enlightening. In fact, it is dispositive. A sidewalk "means that portion of a street2 between 
the curb lines, or the latera/3 lines Q[ a roadway, and the adjacent property lines 
intended for use by pedestrians." LC.§ 49-120(12) (emphasis added). 
This definition is important for two reasons. First, and most critically, it establishes 
that fog lines are "of a roadway," and second, it establishes that a sidewalk does not 
extend to the lines. Of course, "of" means "belonging to, relating to, or connected with 
(someone or something)." www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary /of. The lines therefore 
"belong to" the roadway. Roadways are designed for vehicular travel. Therefore, the lines 
are designed for vehicular travel, and a driver cannot violate the law by traveling on a line 
2 "Street'' and "highway" are synonymous under Title 49. LC.§ 49-109(5) ("The term 'street' is interchangeable 
with highway."). 
3 "Lateral" means "of or relating to the side," i.e., the fog line in this case. 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary /lateral. 
9 
designed for vehicular travel. 
Regardless, it is clear that the roadway exclusions of sidewalks, etc. are intended 
not to include the lines. A sidewalk is the portion of a highway "between ... the lateral 
lines of a roadway and the adjacent property lines[.]" Therefore, a sidewalk clearly does 
not include the lines. Similarly, a shoulder and berm also do not encompass the fog line. 
Those terms are not defined, but they are essentially synonymous. 
www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary /berm ( defining "berm" as "the shoulder of a 
road.") Lane markings and fog lines are clearly designed for vehicular travel, and a 
"shoulder" is the part of a highway "outside of the traveled way." 
www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary /shoulder.4 
Finally, the line is not a part of a right-of-way, which is "the right of one (1) vehicle 
or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or 
pedestrian approaching under circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give 
rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other." I.C. § 49-119(18). 
A right-of-way therefore is simply a person's right, but it has never been argued that there 
existed a person with superior rights to Mr. Neal, i.e., it has never been argued that the fog 
line was a right-of-way. 
Because the fog line is not a right-of-way, sidewalk, berm, or shoulder, it is a part of 
the roadway. Therefore, the line is designed for vehicular travel. Because it is designed 
for vehicular travel, one cannot violate the law for traveling on the line with one's vehicle. 
But regardless, the definition of "sidewalk" is clear that the lines are "of the roadway." On 
4 This dictionary definition uses the term "roadway," but of course only as it applies in the lay (non-legal) sense. 
Webster's obviously did not intend to incorporate the Idaho Code in defining the words contained therein. 
10 
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that basis alone, the stop cannot be premised on a vehicle's touching of a fog line. 
Other courts are in agreement. In United States v. Colin, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that "Even if we interpret section 21658(a) to impose two separate duties on driver -- to 
stay within a single lane and to make safe lane changes -- we conclude that Estrada-Nava 
and Colin did not violate the statute. Estrada-Nava and Colin's car touched for 
approximately ten seconds, but did not cross, the fog line and the solid yellow-painted 
line." 314 F.3d 439,444 (2002) (emphasis supplied); see also, State v. Tarvin, 972 S.W.2d 
910 (Tex. Ct. Crim. Appeals 1998) ("touching the right-hand white line does not constitute 
weaving out of one's lane of traffic").5 
B. The district court Erred by Interpreting Idaho Code§ 49-637 to Require 
Near-Perfect Driving, when the Statute Allows for Driving that is Imperfect 
If the Court determines that touching a fog line does not violate the statute, then 
the Court need not reach this issue of whether Mr. Neal's vehicle was within its lane "as 
nearly as [was] practicable." If the Court reaches this issue, the critical task will involve 
defining the meaning and significance of "as nearly as practicable." Mr. Neal maintains, 
consistently with many other jurisdictions addressing the issue, that this language 
provides Idaho's drivers some flexibility. Perfect driving is not required of all of Idaho's 
motorists. The challenge for the state is to explain how this language can be given 
meaning, while maintaining its position that the language requires near-perfect driving. 
"[E]ffect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, 
superfluous, or redundant." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475 (2007) (quotations 
omitted). 
5 The state also has argued that merely touching a bike lane constitutes a traffic violation. This argument will be 
addressed in section C below. 
11 
Of course, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, freely reviewed by 
this Court Yager, 139 Idaho at 689. Idaho's appellate courts "interpret[] statutes 
according to the plain, express meaning of the provision in question, and will resort to 
judicial construction only if the provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd,6 or arguably 
in conflict with other laws." Id. 
Idaho Code§ 49-637(1) unambiguously permits minor driving imperfections: "A 
vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not 
be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be 
made with safety." ( emphasis added). To the district court, the state argued that "as 
nearly as practicable" does not provide motorists any latitude with regard to maintaining 
a lane, even if the tires merely touch a white line. R. 179 ( arguing that it would be 
"unsafe" for a vehicle's tires to touch white paint near a road's shoulder). The state 
believes that "the phrase requires the driver to remain within the lane markings unless 
the driver cannot reasonably avoid straying." R. 211 (citing State v. Mays, 894 N.E.2d 1204 
(Ohio 2008)). 
The state's interpretation fails to give effect to the "as nearly as practicable" 
language. If that language were removed from the statute, the statute would remain 
substantively identical to the state's interpretation of the statute with the language. 
Therefore, the state's interpretation must be rejected. Compare the following: 
6 It is questionable whether there still remains an "absurdity" trigger for statutory construction of unambiguous 
statutes. Verska v. SaintAlphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011). 
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LC. § 49-63 7 as it actually reads LC.§ 49-637 without the relevant language 
"A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as "A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as 
practicable entirely within a single lane practicable entirely within a single lane 
and shall not be moved from that lane and shall not be moved from that lane 
until the driver has first ascertained that until the driver has first ascertained that 
the movement can be made with safety." the movement can be made with safety_." 
The state interprets "as nearly as practicable" to "require[] the driver to remain 
within the lane markings unless the driver cannot reasonably avoid straying." But the 
statute already states that vehicles may be moved from a lane only if "the movement can 
be made with safety." If a driver "cannot reasonably avoid straying," then that means that 
it would be unsafe for the driver not to stray. Therefore, the driver would need to 
"ascertain" that he could move (or "stray") "with safety," and then he could move from his 
lane. So, if debris were present on the road, a driver would be permitted to move from 
his lane if he first ascertained that the movement could be made with safety. Thus, the 
statute accounts for this type of circumstance without the "as nearly as practicable" 
language. The state therefore essentially interprets "as nearly as practicable" to render it 
"void, superfluous, and redundant" That interpretation must be rejected. 
Instead, the "as nearly as practicable" language clearly qualifies the requirement 
that vehicles maintain their lanes. The word "practicable" alone is most obviously 
intended to provide latitude to drivers. But the legislature went even further, qualifying 
that qualification with the words "as nearly as." The legislature plainly recognized a truth 
apparent to anyone who has driven a vehicle: it is not practicable for a driver to maintain 
a perfect driving pattern throughout his entire commute. See, People v. Manders, 740 
N.E.2d 64, 67 (App. Ct. of Ill. 2000) ("[The Illinois statute] recognizes that a vehicle cannot 
13 
be driven in a perfectly straight line. It states, 'A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as 
practicable entirely within a single lane"') ( emphasis supplied). 
The statute therefore creates one general requirement -- safely maintaining and 
changing lanes -- that is modified with some legislative common sense, by demanding less 
than perfect driving. In Hernandez v. State, the court also interpreted the Texas statute to 
create one offense: "moving out of a marked lane when it is not safe to do so." 983 S.W.2d 
867, 871 (Tex. App. 1998). Thus, crossing a lane dividing line by eighteen to twenty-four 
inches, when the movement is not shown to be unsafe or dangerous, did not provide a 
reasonable basis for suspicion the defendant had committed a violation. And in Corbin v. 
State, the Texas court explained that the "statute presumes a certain degree of common 
sense will be applied to the review of a driver's actions by requiring that a driver shall 
drive 'as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane' and that he may not move from 
the lane unless the movement can be made safely." 33 S.W.3d 90 (Tex. App. 2000) (rev'd 
on other grounds, 85 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). 
The state of Florida analyzes the issue similarly. In Crooks v. State, despite the fact 
that the vehicle crossed the edge line of the shoulder on three occasions, there was no 
violation of the statute. The Florida court said "Because the record does not establish how 
far into the right-hand emergency lane Mr. Crooks drove on any of the three occasions, 
there is no basis to state that he was outside the 'practicable' lane. Even if he was briefly 
outside this margin of error, there is no objective evidence suggesting that Mr. Crooks 
failed to ascertain that his movements could be made with safety." 710 So. 2d 1041, 1042 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1998). In Mr. Neal's case, there was also no evidence to 
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11 
"establish how far into the fog line Mr. Neal drove" and therefore there is "no basis to 
state that he was outside the 'practicable' lane." See also, United States v. Raney, 633 F.3d 
385,939 (5th Cir. 2011) (no violation of statute requiring maintaining a lane "as nearly as 
practical" because there was "no evidence in the record to establish that Raney could not 
move safely into the northbound lane.") 
Likewise, in United States v. Ozbirn, the Tenth Circuit held that "when an officer 
merely observes someone drive a vehicle outside the marked lane, he does not 
automatically have probable cause to stop that person for a traffic violation. The use of 
the phrase 'as nearly as practicable' in the statute precludes such absolute standards, and 
requires a fact-specific inquiry[.]" 189 F.3d 1194 (1999); see also, United States v. Peters, 
2012 WL 1120665 (U.S. S.D. Indiana) at *8 ("To the extent that the Government argues 
that probable cause existed because, on one occasion, Officer Borgmann might have 
reasonably believed that the Denali momentarily and slightly touched the fog line, that 
argument fails as a matter of law. The statute commands only that drivers drive 'as nearly 
as practicable within' the lane."). 
Furthermore, if law enforcement could seize any vehicle based solely on driving as 
"innocuous" as Mr. Neal's, the Fourth Amendment's meaning would be virtually lost in the 
context of vehicular travel. Such a result is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. 
"The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades 
away and disappears." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971). "[I]f 
failure to follow a perfect vector down the highway ... were sufficient reason[] to suspect 
a person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be subject 
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each day to an invasion of their privacy." United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973,976 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
A Tennessee court expressed similar concerns in State v. Binette, in which the court 
found that "Binette did not violate any rules of the road," despite "occasionally drift[ing] 
from the center of the lane," because the "legislature has stated that 'whenever a roadway 
has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, a vehicle shall be 
driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane."' 33 S.W.3d 215,219 (Tenn. 
Sup. Ct. 2000) (alterations omitted, emphasis supplied). The court recognized that finding 
reasonable suspicion "creates a 'stop at will' standard for police since it is a rare 
motorist indeed who can travel for several miles without occasionally varying speed 
unnecessarily, moving laterally from time to time in the motorist's own lane, nearing the 
center line or shoulder[,] or exhibiting some small imperfection in his or her driving." Id. 
at 219-20 (emphasis added). 
The Tenth Circuit, interpreting a statute requiring driving "as nearly as practical 
entirely within a single lane," similarly held that a "single occurrence of moving to the right 
shoulder of the roadway ... could not constitute a violation of Utah law and therefore 
does not warrant the invasion of Fourth Amendment protection." United States v. Gregory, 
79 F.3d 973,978 (10th Cir. 1996). In a case involving similar facts, the Tennessee Court of 
Criminal Appeals reasoned as follows: 
The only evidence here is that the Defendant drove on the white line 
after returning to the right lane of traffic. There was no evidence that the 
Defendant moved out of his lane. There was no evidence that the 
Defendant was driving erratically, weaving, or otherwise causing a hazard to 
other vehicles. Trooper Norrod specifically stated at the suppression 
hearing that he stopped the Defendant for an improper lane change and for 
no other reason, indicating that he did not necessarily conclude the driving 
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on the white line was of particular significance. [S]tanding alone, [driving 
on the white line] is not a sufficient and articulable fact to warrant the 
finding of reasonable suspicion to stop an automobile. We are reluctant 
to conclude that a person driving in a manner that an officer deems 
"improper," when the driving is not erratic or haphazard and does not 
create a dangerous situation, is subject to seizure while proceeding along a 
highway in a lawful manner .... We are not willing to ignore the 
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment and indirectly hold that "[t]he 
word 'automobile' is a talisman in whose presence the Fourth 
Amendment fades away and disappears." See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 461-62, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). 
State v. Smith, 21 S.W.3d 251 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (emphasis added) (alterations 
omitted). 
Mr. Neal's "innocuous driving pattern" clearly falls within the qualifying language 
"as nearly as practicable." The only evidence presented to Magistrate Swain was that Mr. 
Neal's truck tires touched white paint. The state presented no evidence establishing how 
much of the white paint's space had been invaded. Therefore, there was no reason to 
believe that more than a millimeter of white paint made contact with the tires. The Idaho 
Code and the Fourth Amendment demand more than Officer Thueson's observation of 
these everyday driving habits. Officer Thueson lacked any reasonable suspicion that Mr. 
Neal had committed a violation of I.C. § 49-637, because Mr. Neal's driving was well within 
the bounds of the "as nearly as practicable" standard. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the district court's ruling. 
C. The district court Erred when it Invaded the Fact-finding province of the 
Magistrate, and when it Concluded that driving on Unoccupied Bike Markings 
violated the Law 
1. The Magistrate Correctly Found that there was no Evidence that the 
Driving Occurred in Boise 
As explained, the state bears the burden of establishing an exception to the 
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warrant requirement, and if the state fails to meet its burden, the seizure is per se 
unreasonable. If the state argues for an exception, based on an officer's reasonable 
suspicion that a driver violated the Boise City Code, the state must prove that the relevant 
conduct occurred in Boise. IDAHO CONST. ART. XII § 2 ("Any ... incorporated city or town 
may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police ... regulations as are not in 
conflict with ... the general laws.") ( emphasis added). Without proof that the incident 
occurred in Boise, there is no proof that the Boise City Code applies. Without proof that 
the Boise City Code applies, the officer's suspicion is objectively unreasonable. 
The state argued that the Boise City Code applied, but Magistrate Swain correctly 
found that "there is no evidence this occurred in Boise." R. 102. Here, the critical missing 
piece of evidence was when Mr. Neal drove in Boise. It was conceded that Mr. Neal drove 
in Boise at some point on November 14, 2012. However, there was no evidence to 
establish that he was driving in Boise at the specific time on November 14, 2012. Mr. Neal 
testified only that he was "driving [o]n November 14, 2012[, i]n the City of Boise, Ada 
County." Tr. p. 25, 11. 10-18. The stop occurred just before midnight on that day. See, tr. p. 
31, IL 1-14. Therefore, it is unremarkable that Mr. Neal had been driving in Boise at some 
point on November 14, 2012, because he had the entire day to do so. Within 24 hours, 
one can drive from St Louis, Missouri to Boise, Idaho (covering the substantial states of 
Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and Idaho).7 Without proof that Mr. Neal was 
driving in Boise at the relevant time, Magistrate Swain was forced to find that "there is no 
evidence this occurred in Boise." 
7 23 hours 20 minutes, according to Google Maps. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court is clear that evidence of past presence is "no evidence of 
the presence" at the time a traffic stop. Reisenauer v. State, 145 Idaho 949,951 (2008). 
The Court in Reisenauer held that presence of Carboxy-THC is evidence of marijuana's past 
presence in the body, but is "no evidence of the presence of any drug" when the stop 
occurred. Likewise, Mr. Neal's testimony that he was present in Boise at some point "is no 
evidence of" his presence at the time of the traffic stop. 
Without question, substantial and competent evidence supported Magistrate 
Swain's factual finding. While this Court directly reviews the district court, it "examine[s] 
the record before the magistrate[] to determine whether there is substantial and 
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." Medical Recovery Services, LLC 
v. Carnes, 148 Idaho 686, 871 (Ct App. 2010). Substantial and competent evidence is 
"relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Id. 
( emphasis added). 
The district court disagreed with the magistrate regarding how to interpret the 
evidence. R. 222. Respectfully, Mr. Neal submits that the district court failed to apply the 
correct standard of review applicable to a trial court's factual findings. Certainly, the 
district court cited the correct standards, acknowledging that it was "acting as an appellate 
court, not as a trial court," and that, therefore, "the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in 
the trial court." R. 219-20 ( emphasis added) ( quotations omitted). 
Clearly, appellate courts employ a highly deferential standard for reviewing a 
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lower court's factual findings. State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547,549 (Ct. App. 2009) ("we 
defer to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial and competent 
evidence"). The district court afforded no deference to Magistrate Swain's finding that the 
state failed to prove that Mr. Neal's relevant driving occurred in Boise. Based on the 
presented evidence, a "reasonable mind might accept" the conclusion that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that the driving was in Boise. In fact, from the evidence 
presented, the conclusion is inescapable. Therefore, the state failed to meet its burden of 
establishing an exception to the warrant requirement, because it did not establish that the 
relevant driving occurred in Boise. 
2. Even if the Evidence Supported the Inference that the Driving Occurred in 
Boise, the district court Erred by holding that a Violation of the Boise City 
Code had Occurred 
If this Court finds the Boise City Code applicable, it nevertheless should hold that 
the Code was not violated. Below, the state argued that Mr. Neal violated Boise City Code 
§ 10-10-17, which provides as follows: 
No person shall drive a motorized vehicle upon any officially marked bike 
lane, bike path, foot path or other separate right-of-way specifically set aside 
for use by pedestrians or non-motorized vehicles except at an intersection 
or when entering or leaving a roadway at a driveway, private road or alley. 
Prior to crossing a non-motorized right-of-way, the motorist shall yield the 
right-of-way to any pedestrian or non-motorized vehicle operating thereon. 
First, Mr. Neal incorporates by this reference his above argument, in which he 
established that one does not leave his lane, or drive in a less than practicable manner, 
simply by touching a few flakes of white paint. For that reason, the ordinance was not 
violated. Moreover, Boise City Code§ 10-10-17 criminalizes the same conduct (leaving 
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one's lane) thatthe Idaho Legislature has deemed a mere infraction. Therefore, Boise City 
Code§ 10-10-17 cannot be enforced. State v. Reyes, 146 Idaho 778, 781 (Ct. App. 2009) 
("We conclude that the city ordinance that classifies possession of an open container of 
alcohol as a misdemeanor is in direct conflict with the state statute, which classifies 
possession of an open container by a passenger as an infraction. Therefore, the state 
statute controls, and the city ordinance is unconstitutional.") 
Second, if it is true that the white paint is not a part of the lane, as the state has 
argued, then one cannot drive "upon" a bike lane simply by touching the white paint, 
because the white paint is not a part of the lane. Third, the evidence is clear that Mr. 
Neal's contact with the paint occurred at an intersection. The ordinance specifically states 
that its proscription is "except at an intersection." 
The testimony was uncontroverted that the relevant driving occurred "at an 
intersection." Officer Thueson testified that Mr. Neal's vehicle "continued westbound on 
State, until just to the east of Gary Lane, you know where the Jack-in-the-Box is, it again 
drove on top of the solid white line." Tr. p. 32, 11. 3-6. Exhibit F is reproduced on the 
following page. On the left-side of the exhibit is the Jack-in-the-Box. This exhibit 
unequivocally establishes that the stretch of road, "where the Jack-in-the-Box is," forms an 
intersection. 
An "intersection" includes "the area within which vehicles traveling on different 
highways may come into conflict." B.C.C. § 10-01-01. A "highway" includes a "place open 
to the public" such as an entrance to a fastfood restaurant. B.C.C. § 10-01-01. Therefore, 
those leaving the restaurant (on a highway) may "come into conflict" with those driving on 
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State Street (another highway). It necessarily follows, then, that the tires contacted the 
white paint at an intersection. Because the contact occurred at an intersection, the 
ordinance could not have been violated. 
D. The District Court Erred when it Reached its Alternative Basis for Reversal, Based 
on Arguments Never Presented to the Court 
1. This Court should not Consider whether Officer Thueson's Mistake of Law 
was Sufficient to Constitute Reasonable Articulable Suspicion that Mr. Neal 
Violated Idaho's Traffic Laws 
The district court held that "even if Officer Thueson mistakenly believed that Mr. 
Neal violated the statute and ordinance by driving on the marker lines, this would not 
warrant suppression here, as his belief that this was a violation was reasonable, 
particularly given the lack of published Idaho appellate cases settling the issue." R. 227. 
The district court then proceeded to explain the standards primarily applicable to 
mistakes of fact. R. 227-28. Two problems exist with the district court's holding. First, 
the state never presented this argument to the magistrate or on intermediate appeal, 
which deprived Mr. Neal of the opportunity to present argument on the issue. Second, it 
is incorrect that the officer's mistake of law could constitute reasonable articulable 
suspicion that a traffic violation occurred. 
The district court's alternative holding suffers from the same problems attendant 
to advisory opinions, standing/mootness/ripeness issues, and issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. Courts, including Idaho's appellate courts, generally will not issue 
advisory opinions, State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410,419 (2012) ("ruling on the 
Firearm Charge issues has no practical effect on this appeal and would be an 
impermissible advisory opinion.") ( emphasis in original), nor will they consider moot or 
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unripe issues, or cases in which a party lacks standing. See generally, Miles v. Idaho Power 
Co., 116 Idaho 635 (1989). 
One of the primary reasons for labeling such cases "non-justiciable" is that those 
cases lack "the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the 
court so depends for illumination[.]" Id. at 641. The adversarial process is the foundation 
of the judicial system's truth-seeking purpose. Without a sufficiently adversarial setting, 
upon which the system relies, courts are not adequately presented with competing 
adversarial arguments. Therefore, if the issue is not ripe, the courts will not consider it 
because consideration would lack "the concrete adversariness" necessary to sufficiently 
inform the court Identically, an intermediate appellate court violates the same principles 
when it rests its decision on an alternative basis never addressed by either side. It lacks 
"the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court so 
depends for illumination." 
For related reasons, appellate courts cannot consider arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal. Recently, in State v. Morgan, the state attempted to justify a traffic 
stop based on an alleged violation of a city ordinance. _Idaho_, 294 P.3d 1121, 1124 
(2013). However, the state failed to argue the applicability of the ordinance to the lower 
court. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the state would violate the defendant's 
right to due process if the Court considered the state's argument for the first time on 
appeal. Id. Moreover, absent fundamental error (inapplicable here), Idaho's courts 
"follow the procedural principle that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be 
considered on appeal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 225 (2010); see also, State v. 
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McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 125 (Ct App. 1999) ("Because this is a theory that was not 
advanced by the prosecutor at the suppression hearing, McCarthy had no opportunity to 
respond through evidence and the magistrate did not address it in his findings. 
Consequently, we will not consider it") 
In this case, the district court considered an argument never presented to the 
magistrate or to itself. The court's rationale therefore violated the procedural principle 
prohibiting consideration of issues first raised on appeal; it violated Mr. Neal's right to 
due process; and it undermined the fundamental requirement of adversariness upon 
which our judicial system relies. Therefore, the district court erred, and its alternative 
holding benefitting the state should be reversed without consideration of its merit 
2. Even if this Court Considers the district court's Alternative Rationale, 
Officer Thueson's Mistake of Law did not Constitute a Reasonable Suspicion 
that Mr. Neal Violated Idaho's Traffic Laws 
If this Court chooses to consider the district court's holding, this Court should hold 
that the district court erred in determining that Officer Thueson's mistake of law 
constituted a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred. In Burton v. State, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to a license suspension based on the 
argument that "no legal cause existed ... to stop her vehicle." 149 Idaho 746, 747 (2010). 
Specifically, she contended that there was "no legal cause" because the basis for the stop --
Idaho Code§ 49-808(1) -- was vague as applied to her. The Court of Appeals agreed, and 
held that, because Idaho Code§ 49-808(1) "could not be constitutionally applied to 
[Burton,] no legal cause existed to effectuate the traffic stop that led to her breath tests." 
Id. at 750. 
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It is difficult to square the Burton decision with the argument that an officer's 
mistake of law may justify an otherwise invalid seizure. The issue in Burton was whether 
"legal cause" existed to effect a seizure. A year before Burton, in Wheeler v. Idaho Transp. 
Dept., the Court of Appeals employed the "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard in 
analyzing the "legal cause" issue. 148 Idaho 378 (2009) (finding "legal cause" because "an 
officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable 
and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws."). 
Therefore, if reasonable suspicion exists, legal cause exists. It appears, therefore, that the 
"legal cause" analysis includes the "reasonable articulable suspicion" analysis. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals effectively held that, if a traffic law is void as applied, the 
seizing law enforcement officer cannot possess a reasonable suspicion that the traffic 
violation had occurred. The Court of Appeals' conclusion is incompatible with reasonable 
suspicion premised on a mistake of law. The reasonable suspicion standard focuses on 
the reasonableness measured from the facts known to the officer. It is based on the 
officer's perspective. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The 
justification for an investigative detention is evaluated upon the totality of the 
circumstances then known to the officer.") 
The void for vagueness doctrine, on the other hand, involves a differently focused 
inquiry. It does not rely on the information available to the officer. Rather, the focus 
would instead be on the sufficiency of notice to the driver. "Due process requires that all 
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids and that men of common 
intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law." Burton, 149 Idaho 
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at 7 48. If mistake of law is an excuse, then an officer may in fact act "reasonably" when 
enforcing a vague traffic law -- it was the legislature that acted unreasonably by leaving 
the officer too much discretion. But if he was acting reasonably, there would be legal 
cause to effect the stop. However, according to the Court of Appeals, there is no legal 
cause (and therefore no reasonable suspicion) to effect a traffic stop based on a vague 
traffic law. 
It seems clear in Idaho that the invalidity of a traffic law renders any suspicion 
unreasonable. It is unreasonable because the traffic law does not apply to the driver. 
Likewise, in this case, the traffic law did not apply to Mr. Neal, and therefore any of Officer 
Thueson's suspicions were unreasonable. As Judge Schwartzman stated in State v. 
McCarthy, '"good faith' should not be able to save a stop made because the officer made a 
mistake as to the applicable speed limit. Otherwise, the standard to be reviewed will 
become transmuted into not what the law is, but that which the officer, in 'good faith,' 
believes it to be." 133 Idaho 119 (Ct. App. 1999) (concurring). Other jurisdictions have 
held that a "reasonable" mistake of law does not suffice for purposes of reasonable 
suspicion. Byer v. Jackson, 241 A.D.2d 943 (1997); State v. Longcore, 226 Wis.2d 1 (App. 
1999); UnitedStatesv. King, 244 F.3d 736,741 (9th Cir. 2001) (officer's mistake of law, 
even in good faith, cannot form the basis of reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop). 
The bottom line is that an officer's reasonableness is measured objectively. A legal 
conclusion is either objectively correct or it is not. If it was not, then the officer's actions, 
measured objectively, were unreasonable per se. 
Even if mistake of law were not per se unreasonable, it is clear in this case that 
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Officer Thueson's interpretation of the law was objectively unreasonable. The law is clear 
that a fog line is used for vehicular travel. Perhaps Officer Thueson was ignorant of the 
law, but that fact is certainly insufficient to be considered "reasonable." Ignorance of the 
law is no defense for a criminal defendant. State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1993) 
("Ignorance of the law is not a defense."); see also, State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 462 
(2012) ("The defendant is also presumed to know that the charge includes both 
committing the crime as the principal and acting as an accessory before the fact.") The 
legislature is presumed to know the law. Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214, 
219 (2011) ("the legislature is presumed to know the common law rule.") Everyone is 
presumed to know the law. 
It would be highly anomalous, then, to impose this requirement on all of society 
except those who enforce the law. Fortunately, such is not the case. State v. Johnson, 110 
Idaho 516, 521-22 (1986) ("The police officer is imputed with knowledge of the law"). 
Perhaps Officer Thueson would be surprised by certain interpretations of the law, but 
again, that is not always sufficient, even for criminal defendants. See, State v. Maidwell, 137 
Idaho 424 (2002) (overruling State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379 (1993) and vacating a 
dismissal of a criminal complaint, despite stating that "We agree with the lower courts that 
there is no logical basis for distinguishing this case from State v. Barnes.") Because the 
officer's mistake of law was objectively unreasonable, he lacked reasonable articulable 
suspicion to seize Mr. Neal. 
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VI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court and remand 
this case for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULl,Y SUBMITTED, 
DATED: (V\ "'{ vl () 
SIGNED: 
Eric Scott, A 
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I CERTIFY that on~ I caused to be served two true and correct 
copies of this docwncnt on the Idaho Attorney General, by mailing, postage prepaid, the same to Idaho 
Attorney GeneraL 700 W. Jefferson St., Boise, ID 83720. 
DATED: 
SIGNED: 
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